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The British voter is less likely than the American to make a distinction 
between his current electoral choice and a more general partisan dispo- 
sition. This article investigates whether this difference might be due to a 
methodological difference between the British and American Election 
surveys: the British surveys, unlike the American, have placed the party 
identification question after the question on electoral choice, and this 
order may encourage the British respondents to bring their reports of their 
party identification into line with their actual votes. A split-sample panel 
study experiment was conducted to test this hypothesis. The results were 
not decisive, but they did suggest that the ‘improper’ question order 
elicited a smaller proportion of ‘true’ party identifiers and produced 
response uncertainty in the reporting of party identification. 
The concept of party identification is routinely employed in the analysis of British 
electoral behaviour, but it carries with it the aura of original sin that it acquired 
when Butler and Stokes (1969) first investigated the phenomenon in the British 
political context but preferred to label it ‘partisan self-image’ rather than call it by 
the familiar name used in the United States. 
Butler and Stokes acknowledged that partisan self-images in Britain displayed 
many of the properties associated with party identification in the United States. The 
strength of partisan self-image intensified with age; partisan self-images were more 
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stable than partisan electoral choices across time; and partisan self-images were 
associated with the ‘homing tendency’ displayed in the United States by voters who 
defect at election time from their standing party identifications. But partisan seif- 
images in Britain appeared to differ from party identifications in the United States 
in two ways: 
1. Across roughly equivalent electoral intervals, US voters were some four times 
more likely than British voters to change their partisan electoral choices but retain 
their party identifications (partisan self-images) than they were to vary their party 
identifications (self-images) but maintain their partisan electoral preferences. 
2. British voters were twice as likely as US voters to change both their party 
identifications (self-images) and their partisan electoral preferences across roughly 
the same electoral intervals. 
Summing up these two specific findings, Butler and Stokes (1969, p. 43) stated 
that ‘the British voter is less likely than the American to make a distinction between 
his current electoral choice and a more general partisan disposition’. 
Butler and Stokes suggested that this Anglo-American difference in electoral 
behaviour was due to the difference between the system of balloting in the two 
countries. The British ballot for a national legislative election is very simple: it 
contains only the names (and parties) of the candidates for a single seat in the 
House of Commons; no other electoral choices are made at the same time. This 
contrasts sharply with the long ballot containing the name of candidates (and their 
parties) for a variety of national, state and local offices, as well possibly of refer- 
endum propositions, that is typically used in the United States. This difference in 
electoral mechanics, Butler and Stokes suggested, has given partisan ‘dispositions’ 
a more durable and commanding position relative to particular electoral choices in 
the United States than they enjoy within the British political context. 
Without seeking to refute that argument, which appears plausible on its face 
value, we offer an alternate explanation for the cross-national differences in 
electoral behaviour that Butler and Stokes uncovered. The ordering of the questions 
in two of the three survey instruments employed by Butler and Stokes for their 
panel study may well have contributed towards blurring the essential distinction 
between party identification as a long-term personal attachment to a party, on the 
one hand, and a current partisan preference, on the other hand. 
The procedure for eliciting the respondents’ partisan identifications and electoral 
choices that is regularly employed in the US National Election Studies series 
includes asking first about party identification and later about current electoral 
preferences. That is the order followed when, as in off-years, there is only one post- 
electoral wave of interviews. When, as in the case of almost all presidential-year 
studies, there are both pre-electoral and post-electoral interviews, the two questions 
are even more sharply separated in that party identification is elicited at the pre- 
electoral interview and partisan electoral choice is elicited at the post-electoral inter- 
view. The US data which Butler and Stokes used for their Anglo-American 
comparison rested on the pre- and post-electoral National Election Studies surveys 
for 1956 and 1960, and the single post-electoral survey for the off-year of 1958. 
The British data on which Butler and Stokes relied for their comparative analy- 
sis derived from one survey. conducted during the late spring and summer of 1963. 
that was neither in the wake of a general election nor close to a forthcoming 
election, and two post-electoral surveys, one following the election of October 1964 
and the other that of March 1966. The 1963 survey employed the question order 
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typical of the US National Election Studies: partisan self-image was elicited prior to 
asking about the respondents’ hypothetical vote intentions. In the two post- 
electoral studies of 1964 and 1966, however, the question order was reversed. In 
the 1964 survey, respondents were asked about their electoral choice at the 1964 
election in Question 40d, while they were asked for their partisan self-image in 
Question 49a. In the 1966 instrument, the corresponding questions were Q.44~ and 
Q.48a, rather more closely adjacent than they had been in the 1964 questionnaire.’ 
The controlling assumption of this paper is that the two different question orders, 
the one routinely applied in the United States and used by Butler and Stokes in 
1963, and the other employed by Butler and Stokes in 1964 and 1966, are not 
psychologically equivalent. The US ordering creates no urge in the respondents to 
be consistent in the two declarations of partisanship. The flow of meaning is from 
the general to the specific. This is a distinction with which everyone is familiar and 
which regularly produces contrasts that cause no psychological discomfort. People 
can like dogs generally but not like dobermans. 
The opposite path, from the specific to the general, is less smooth. Once one 
has expressed a specific partisan choice, it would seem to be less than psychologi- 
cally satisfying also to declare that one’s more general partisan orientation is differ- 
ent. This would, we believe, be all the more true if the respondents were not given 
any indication that the question about partisan self-image was not meant to be 
considered within the context of a recent election but rather within the framework 
of a longer term, more general orientation towards the parties. The 1964 and 1966 
British election studies, however, blurred that distinction. In those two studies, the 
question designed to elicit partisan self-image followed immediately upon a series 
of questions that referred specifically to the recent election. 
We believe that in these circumstances, more British voters were subjected to 
the impulse to make their later declaration, relating to partisan self-image, consis- 
tent with their earlier report of their recent electoral choice, than US voters are to 
make their later report of their recent electoral choice consistent with their earlier 
expression of a long-term partisan attachment. 
If this hypothesis is correct, the central Butler/Stokes finding that British voters 
make less of a distinction than US voters do between general partisan self-images 
and current partisan preferences is an artefact of their data-gathering technique in 
Britain and not something rooted in the country’s pattern of political behaviour. 
And, if that is so, one can not only talk about ‘party identification’ in Britain with 
a clear conscience but also assume that there is less difference between British and 
US mass electoral behaviour than Butler and Stokes thought. 
The Structure of the Experiment 
In order to test our hypothesis that question order affects the degree to which 
British voters distinguish between long-term partisan dispositions and current parti- 
san preferences, we mounted a split-sample panel study experiment.* Specifically, 
we converted the 1983 British election study into the first wave of a three-wave 
panel study, whose second and third waves, conducted in 1986 and 1987 respec- 
tively, were randomly divided into two groups. One group was posed the questions 
relating to the vote and party identification in the order employed by Butler and 
Stokes in 1964 and 1966 (as well as in 1983); the question order was reversed for 
the second group, which was asked the two relevant questions in the order 
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typically used in the United States and by Butler and Stokes for Britain in 1963.3 
We then subjected this data set to a series of tests, each of which was designed to 
discover whether the order of the questions affected the extent to which British 
voters distinguished between party identification and current partisan preference. 
Before discussing those particular tests, it is important to comment on some of 
the properties of our three-wave panel. 
1. The British party system of the 1980s was more complex than that of the 
196Os, when the Butler/Stokes surveys were conducted. The appearance of the 
Social Democratic Party and its alliance with the Liberals enlarged the party system 
so that it now included Liberals, Social Democrats and the Alliance in the space 
that had earlier been occupied only by the Liberals. The larger party system of the 
1980s relative to the 1960s meant that one could expect less stability in both party 
identification and current partisan preferences in the later period than there had 
been in the earlier one (Heath et al., 1991, chap. 2). 
2. We have measures of both party identification and the recent partisan vote 
for both 1983 and 1987. For 1986, however, while we have measures of PI, we 
have only the expression of partisan vote intention as the measure of current party 
preference. The original Butler/Stokes study was similarly unbalanced, although it 
was their first wave that lacked the declaration of an actual vote while it is our 
second wave that lacks it. 
The asymmetry is more troublesome for us, however, than it was for Butler and 
Stokes, for two reasons. First, the lack of true vote report for the middle wave of 
our three-wave panel study means that we must bridge our widest temporal gap, 
from 1983 to 1987, in order to match comparable declarations of current electoral 
preference. Because of the more compressed time span of the original Butler/Stokes 
panel, even if they had excluded their first wave, the remaining panel would still 
permit comparisons across only a two-year period. 
The second reason compounds the difficulty created by the first. Our third panel 
wave naturally suffers both from attrition in numbers and a disproportionate loss 
of the politically uninvolved. Those properties alone, however, would not be par- 
ticularly disturbing. The loss in case numbers is not decisive for any of our analy- 
ses. And we have weighted appropriately to restore the 1983 proportions of 
involved and uninvolved respondents among our third wave panel survivors.’ The 
major difficulty is that even after taking panel attrition into account, our third wave 
respondents, regardless of which of the two experimental groups they fall in, are 
much more politically involved than any of our cross-section samples, whether for 
1983, 1986 or 1987. Between 1986 and 1987, the proportion of uninvolved persons 
in our sample declined by almost 50 per cent. 
That is a very large change, which can only be the result of response error. The 
only plausible source of the error that we can imagine is panel conditioning. Butler 
and Stokes (1969, p. 457) were alert to the possibility of such learning among the 
respondents of their own panel but did not detect any. The only reason we can 
think of why our sample should display such an effect so strikingly, compared with 
the Butler/Stokes t-ml finding, is that our third wave of interviews followed onl) 
one year after the second wave, while two years separated the Butler/Stokes second 
and third waves. 
Whatever the explanation may be for the existence of the disproportionateI) 
large population of politically involved respondents among our third wave respon- 
dents, their presence badly biases our third wave sample. It is precisely the less 
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politically involved persons who would be least liieiy to be sensitive to the subtle 
difference between current partisan preference and long-term party identification 
(if they do in fact register a party identification) and, consequently, most likely to 
confound the two. The sharp drop in numbers of such people at our third wave 
means that any differences between our two experimental groups in 1987 are likely 
to be highly attenuated.5 
3. The 1983 survey was conducted before we designed our split-sample panel 
experiment, so it was not divided into two groups, and the relevant questions 
concerning party identi~cation and current electoral preference were asked in what 
we hypothesize to be the ‘wrong’ order. The population of 1983 identifiers, there- 
fore, contains some proportion of respondents whose declaration of party identifi- 
cation was, according to our hypothesis, merely the expression of a current partisan 
preference. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that this proportion was 
larger than usual in 1983. The instability in the British party system to which we 
already referred was particularly intense between 1979 and 1983, at least as 
measured in net aggregate terms. Assuming a four-party system [including the 
Conservatives, Labour, Liberals (and, from 1983 to 1987, the Social Democratic 
Party or the Alliance as well as the Liberals), and ‘Other’], aggregate net change in 
the proportions of the vote cast for each party between 1979 and 1983 was 23.2 
per cent, compared with 6.4 per cent between 1983 and 1987, 11.6 per cent 
between 1959 and 1964, and 8.1 between 1964 and 1966. The potential for con- 
fusion between long-term party identification and current party preference would 
have been at its post-World War Two high in 1983. This means, of course, that we 
are faced with still another factor that would operate to attenuate any differences 
that we might find between our two experimental groups in 1986 or 1987, when 
those groups are linked for analytical purposes with our single 1983 sample. 
When this potentiality for weak effects in the comparisons between 1983, on the 
one hand, and the two later years, on the other hand, is added to the reduction in 
variance that we expect to fmd in 1987 because of the disproportionately large 
number of involved voters among our 1987 panel survivors, it is apparent that we 
ought not to rely heavily on analyses that bridge 1983 and 1987. Accordingly, we 
include only one 1983-87 linkage among our discrete tests. 
Tests of the Hypothesis 
We performed five basic tests on our data set. Three were based only on cross- 
sectional data. The other two tests exploited the panel properties of our data. Remem- 
ber that the 1986 and 1987 panels were each divided into an A group and a B group. 
The A group was subjected to what we hypothesize to be the ‘wrong’ question order- 
ing; the B group was queried according to the right’ question ordering. Our exper- 
imental hypothesis is that the people in the B group will be less likely to equate party 
identification with current partisan preference than the people in group A will.” 
Cross-sectionat Analyses 
1. The Frequency of Party Identification. We would expect the proportion of 
reported party identifiers to be more numerous in Group A than in Group B. We 
would expect, further, that identifications with new parties, and references to 
questionable parties, would be more numerous in Group A than Group B. The 
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results of this test, for 1986, appear in Table 1. The magnitude of the differences 
between the two groups is small, but the differences are in the right direction. A 
larger proportion of Group A than of Group B reports identifying with a party, and 
the results for Group A contain a larger proportion of new parties and question- 
able cases than do those for Group B. The difference in the proportions of 
none/don’t knows is statistically significant at .the 0.05 level (using a one-tailed 
difference of proportions test). 
2. The Strength of Party Identification by Age. Inasmuch as one expects 
strength of party identification to intensify with age, while there should be no 
relationship between age and strength of current party preference in the absence 
of a matching partisan identification (Converse and Pierce, 1985, pp. 154-6) the 
strength of PI within Group B should correlate with age more closely than it does 
within Group A. That is what we find. Again, for 1986, the difference is small, but 
in the right direction (r = 0.28 for Group B and 0.24 for Group A).’ 
3. Identity of Party Identification and Current Partisan Preference. Our third 
test, which in principle should have been among the most simple and decisive, in 
fact turned out to be neither, although it raises issues of central importance in 
measuring different aspects of partisanship (see Converse and Pierce, 1985). If, as 
we hypothesize, the Group A respondents are more likely than those in Group B 
to confound current partisan preferences, with party identifications, those results 
should emerge clearly from simple cross-tabulations of those two variables, for each 
of our groups, as they were measured in 1986. 
The problem, however, is that we do not have an unambiguous measure of 
current partisan preference for 1986. The most reliable indicator of current prefer- 
ence is the report of how the respondents cast their votes at a recent election, but 
of course there was no general election in 1986. Another measure of current voting 
preference is the frequently used question: ‘Which party would you vote for if there 
were a general election tomorrow. V The relevant measure in the 1986 survey was 
of a different kind. The respondents were first asked if they had decided how they 
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would vote in the next election, and then, if they replied that they had, they were 
asked for which party they had decided to vote. That is certainly a measure of parti- 
san preference, but while it might only reflect the current preferences of some 
respondents, it might rest on general, longer-term partisan attachments for others. 
In these circumstances, what should the experimental hypothesis actually be? If 
our vote intention measure reflects current partisan preferences, we would expect 
the overlap between them and party identification to be greater for Group A than 
for Group B. If the measure reflects long-standing partisan dispositions, the overlap 
should be greater for Group B than for Group A? In point of fact, the overlap is 
virtually identical for the two groups, which is perhaps not surprising, given the 
inherent ambiguity of our measure of partisan preference for 1986. 
Panel Analyses 
4. The Stability of Party Identification. The longitudinal stability of true party 
ident~catio~ should be greater than that of an admixture of true and false party 
identifications. We tested this proposition three ways. 
First, we simply cross-tabulated (for each of our two experimental groups) Party 
Identification in 1983 with Party Identification in 1986, among people who regis- 
tered a party identification at both waves. The result, which appears in Table 2(a), 
moderately supports our basic hypothesis that Group B will contain a larger pro- 
portion of true identifiers than Group A does. 
We have already remarked, however, that our 1983 identifiers were determined 
on the basis of what we hypothesize to be a faulty question ordering and, there- 
fore, must be assumed to contain false as well as true identifiers. In order to try to 
remove the false identifiers from the 1983 sample, we reduced the panel set to 
include only those reported 1983 identifters whose PI was not the same as their 
TABLE 2. Stability of party identifcation (1986) 
(a) Among respondents with a party identification 
in both 1983 and 1986 
Grotrp A Group B 
% % 
Same PI 80.5 83.5 
Different PI 19.5 16.5 
100.0 100.0 
(N 442) gu 413) 
(b) Among respondents whose 1983 party 
identification did not match their 1983 electoral 
preference 
Group A Group B 
% % 
Same PI 36.7 47.1 
Different PI 53.1 39.1 
No PI in 1986 8.2 6.8 
Don’t know PI in 1386 2.0 7.0 
100.0 100.0 
@J 49) (N 41) 
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vote. These respondents, by definition, cannot include anyone who equated a 
current electoral preference with a party identification. Then, in a second analysis, 
we reran the same cross tabulation, for each of our two experimental groups, 
between PI in 1983 and PI in 1986, that we first ran for the entire 1983 panel set. 
The results of this second analysis appear in Table 2(b). Case numbers are, of 
course, sharply reduced, but this time the difference between Groups A and B, 
which is still in the proper direction, is more decisive. Even taking into account 
cases of no PI and Don’t Knows in 1986, a distinctly larger proportion of people 
in Group B than in Group A retained the same PI. If one reduces the set further 
to include only persons who registered a PI at both waves (as we did in our first 
longitudinal analysis), case numbers shrink still further, but the difference between 
the two groups widens, and in the predicted direction.9 
5. Joint Turnover of Party Identification and Electoral Preference. The 
Butler/Stokes proposition about the greater likelihood of British voters than US ones 
to equate current electoral preferences with partisan self-images rested on two now- 
famous joint turnover tables that have been reproduced in various guises since 
Butler and Stokes (1969, pp. 41-42) first presented them (Cain and Ferejohn, 1981; 
Converse and Pierce, 1986, p. 88; LeDuc, 1981). These tables, which took the form 
presented in Fig. 1, included only those British and US respondents who professed 
both a party identification and an electoral preference at each of three waves of 
panel surveys. The analysis compared the proportions of voters in each country 
whose partisan self-image and whose voting preference remained constant or 
changed across the 1963- 1964-1966 panel period for Britain and the 
1956-1958-1960 panel period for the United States. The Butler/Stokes proposition 
that we are testing here derived from two elements of the comparison. First, the 
ratio of cell b to cell c was some eight times larger for the United States than for 
Britain, signifying a much greater tendency for US voters than for British ones to 
change their vote without changing their party identifications. Second, the magni- 
tude of cell d was twice as large proportionately for Britain as for the United States. 
This indicated a much greater propensity in Britain than in the United States for 
voters to change both their party identification and their current electoral prefer- 
ence within the panel time frame. 
For the final test of our series, we tried as nearly as possible to replicate the 
Butler/Stokes joint turnover tables for each of our two experimental groups. The 
match could not, of course, be very close, for reasons that we have touched on 
along the way. The original Butler/Stokes comparison between Britain and the 
Voting preference 
Stable Variable 
Stable a b 
Partisan 
Self-image 
Variable c d 
a+b+c+d = 100% 
Fig. 1. l’lvz htlcr-Stokes joint turnover table 
Source: D. Butler and D. Stokes, Political Cixmge in 
Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice, (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1969). 
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A. Group A 
Voting preference 
Stable Variable 
Stable 75.9 6.4 82.3 
Party 
Identification 
Variable 10.5 7.2 17.7 
86.4 13.6 100.0% 
(N = 220) 
B. Group B 
Voting preference 
Stable Variable 
Stable 80.4 4.9 85.3 
Party 
Identification 
Variable 5.9 8.8 14.7 
86.3 13.7 100.0% 
(N = 202) 
FIG. 2. Joint turnover of party identification and 
electoral preference (Great Britain, 1983-86-87). 
United States covered different time spans and did not rest on wholly identical 
variables, so no single replication of our own could possibly match both terms of 
theirs. But even limiting ourselves to the British side, there are differences that 
cannot be overcome. The Butler/Stokes panel span was three years while ours is 
four years. Butler and Stokes had reports of ‘true’ votes for their second and third 
waves; we had them for our first and third waves. Only two years separated their 
true vote reports while four years separated ours. Yet the logic of our investigation 
compels us to come as close as we can to replicating the analyses from which the 
problem under investigation originated. 
The results appear in Fig 2. Part (A) of Fig. 2 reports the results for our Group 
A, which was subjected to the ‘wrong’ question order in 1983, 1986 and 1987, 
while Part (B) presents the results for the respondents in Group B, who were 
questioned about their partisanship in the ‘right’ order in 1986 and 1987 (but not 
in 1983). Our interest lies, of course, in comparing Group A with Group B, with a 
view to discovering whether there are differences between them similar to the 
differences that Butler and Stokes uncovered between Britain and the United States. 
Our hypothesis is that our Group A will more closely resemble the Butler/Stokes 
findings for Britain, while our Group B more nearly match the Butler/Stokes table 
for the United States. 
The results do not support the hypothesis. The two dynamic properties that 
Butler and Stokes found to differ between the United States and Britain during the 
late 1950s and 1960s are not mirrored in corresponding differences between our 
two experimental groups. The ratio of cell b to cell c differs only slightly from one 
table to the other, and the proportion of respondents occupying cell d is very 
similar in the two tables. Fig. 2(A) does not resemble the Butler and Stokes turnover 
table for Britain in the 1960s; Fig. 2(B) does not look like their corresponding table 
for the United States. On the basis of this test, we cannot say that the respondents 
in Group A display more of a tendency than those in Group B to equate party identi- 
fication with current electoral preference. 
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Of course, we had reason from the start for believing that when we cross- 
tabulated the results for the 1983 sample (with its admixture of presumed true and 
false identifiers) with our 1987 sample (which included a disproportionately small 
number of uninvolved citizens), passing through our 1986 sample (for which we 
had only declarations of future vote intention and not true expressions of electoral 
preference), any differences between our two experimental groups would be highly 
attenuated. 
We do not, however, want to press that argument too far. Despite the factors 
moving our two groups towards convergence, Fig. 2 reveals two important differ- 
ences between groups A and B that suggest that question order does indeed affect 
the reliability of professions of party identification. 
First, party identification across the entire panel span was greater for Group B 
than for Group A. As in the cases of several of our other tests, the magnitude of 
the difference is small-a matter of only three percentage points-but the differ- 
ence is in the right direction. True party identifications should be more stable than 
admixtures of true party identifications and current party preferences. 
The second difference, which is related to the first, is that almost twice as many 
people from Group A as from Group B, proportionately, were stable in their ex- 
pressions of electoral preference but unstable in their declarations of party identifi- 
cation. (This difference was significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed difference 
of proportions test.) We would normally not expect a large proportion of respon- 
dents to fall in cell c; in the original Butler and Stokes tables, only 4 per cent of 
British voters and 2 per cent of US voters did so. 
There are, however, two factors than can plausibly account for the increased 
proportions of people populating the c cells of Fig. 2. One is methodological, while 
the other is purely political, although both are related to the greater fragmentation 
of the British party system during the 1980s as compared with the 1960s. Because 
there was only one Alliance candidate in any constituency in 1983 and 1987, and 
that candidate could be either a Liberal or a Social Democrat, we have counted all 
three of those labels as equivalent in our analysis of voting preference. Thus a voter 
who switched from voting Liberal to voting Social Democrat, or the reverse, counts 
as stable in our calculations. Party identifications, however, are necessarily discrete. 
Therefore, a voter whose party identification changed from Liberal to Social 
Democrat, or the reverse, counts as variable. There were no comparable com- 
plexities during the 1960s. 
But even apart from the possible effects of our handling of Alliance candidates 
for analytical purposes, there were political reasons why more Conservative or 
Labour identifiers than usual might be led to change their party identification but 
not their vote (I’ve always been a Conservative, but I can’t stand that woman, I’ve 
always been for Labour, but this isn’t the party I’ve known). 
There are, therefore, good reasons why there should be a larger proportion of 
persons in the c cells of the two tables of Fig. 2, that represent Britain in the un- 
stable 1980s than there were in the original Butler and Stokes table reflecting the 
more placid 1960s. The fact remains, however, that nearly twice as many people 
from Group A as from Group B, proportionately, reported stable voting preferences 
but variable party identifications. 
We can think of no reason for the phenomenon other than that the respondents 
in Group A were more confused than those in Group B about the meaning of the 
question they were asked concerning their general feelings of partisan attachment, 
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so soon after they had already declared their partisan preferences. Some people in 
Group A may have been impelled by the question order to make a profession of 
partisanship consistent with their prior declaration of electoral preference at one 
or two interview waves but not at all of them. We have already suggested, in 
connection with our third test, that the impulse toward consistency may be weaker 
when statements of vote intention, as opposed to actual vote reports, are involved. 
In this, our f&h and final test, we have not shown that ‘wrong’ question order 
induces respondents to bring their professions of party identification into line with 
their earlier declarations of current electoral preference. We have, however, un- 
covered clear indications that wrong question order can produce a higher than 
normal level of response uncertainty. 
Discussion 
We have conducted five different types of tests in the effort to determine whether 
question order may have accounted for the greater tendency of British voters than 
of US ones to equate current party preference with party ident~cation that was 
reported by Butler and Stokes (1969, p. 43) almost a quarter of a century ago. The 
problem remains of how to evaluate the results. We could, of course, simply add 
up the number of times our hypothesis was not rejected and how many times it 
was. That would be incomplete and misleading, however, without also referring to 
the specific fmdings of each test and the particular properties of the data used for 
each test. 
Our first two tests, which rested on clean measures of party identification that 
differed onIy in their order in the questionnaires relative to questions about current 
electoral preference, indicated modestly but unambiguously that more ‘true’ ident- 
ifiers are uncovered when the question about party identification precedes the 
question about current electoral preference than when it follows it. 
Our third test was designed to be a direct test of the hypothesis that more respon- 
dents equate party identification with current party preference when the former is 
elicited after, rather than before, the latter. The test failed, but it was also an uncer- 
tam test, in that it rested in part on a measure of future vote intention as opposed 
to a measure of recent partisan choice. The negative outcome, therefore, must be 
held in abeyance, until such time as a more proper test can be mounted. 
Our fourth test differed from the first three in that it included a dynamic compa 
nent, which is particularly appropriate given that the elements of electoral theory 
that surround the concept of party identification are important especially for their 
dynamic implications. We performed two variations of this dynamic test, and each 
of them sustained our hypothesis. Moreover, these variants of the fourth test, like 
our first two, simpler tests, were clean in the designation of the sets of respondents 
and consistent in the measures employed. As a result, we place particular empha- 
sis on the result of this fourth test. 
Finally, our fifth and most ambitious test, which in principle ought to have been 
the centrepiece of our analysis, was almost hopelessly flawed by measurement 
mismatches beyond our control. Like our third test, this one was designed to tackle 
head-on, and in an even more complex dynamic framework, the issue of why 
Britons more so than Americans had seemed to Butler and Stokes to equate party 
identification with current party preference. We found no direct support in the data 
for our hypothesis that question order is responsible for that particular 
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phenomenon. We did, however, find evidence that what we hypothesize to be 
inappropriate question order can produce confusion in the minds of the respon- 
dents about what they are being asked, with the result that people report party 
identifications that are not in fact true. 
Taking all of these results and qualifications into account, it would appear that 
we have not been able to show beyond reasonable doubt that improper question 
order causes respondents to equate party identification with current electoral 
preference, but we have been able to support the propositions that: 
1. Proper question order elicits a larger proportion of true party identifiers than 
improper question order does; and 
2. Improper question order produces response uncertainty in the reporting of 
party identification. 
Students of British electoral behaviour would do well to mount a new and purer 
split-sample survey experiment than we are able to do, in order to put this question 
to rest once and for all. In the meantime, we suggest that they resist the tempta- 
tion to distinguish between what Butler and Stokes referred to as partisan self-image 
and what others call party identification. Britons and Americans are almost surely 
not as different in their electoral behaviour as Butler and Stokes thought they were. 
Notes 
1. This same question order, with the question concerning the vote preceding the question 
concerning party identification, was retained in all succeeding British electoral studies in 
the same series through 1987. 
2. The data come from the 1983-6-7 British Election Panel Study. Respondents for the panel 
study were taken from the 1983 British Election Survey, a stratified nationally-represen- 
tative probability sample of the electorate, drawn from 250 parliamentary constituencies, 
and interviewed in the weeks following the 1983 general election. 3955 respondents were 
interviewed in this survey, a response rate of 72.4 per cent. (For further details see Heath, 
Jowell and Curtice, 1985.) For cost reasons, it was decided not to follow up all the respon- 
dents to the 1983 survey. Respondents in 115 of the original 250 constituencies were 
chosen (the 115 constituencies being selected on a systematic random basis within the 
strata used for drawing the original 250). At the end of the 1983 survey, respondents 
were asked whether they were willing to be re-interviewed. After deletion of those unwill- 
ing to be re-interviewed, 1634 respondents’ names and addresses were issued to inter- 
viewers. One round of interviews took place in November/December 1986, and a total 
of 1090 productive interviews were achieved. For the final round of interviews, which 
were undertaken immediately after the 1987 general election, 1020 names and addresses 
were issued to interviewers (the remaining 70 having said in 1986 that they were unwill- 
ing to be re-interviewed). 869 productive interviews were achieved. For details of the 
components of non-response see Farrant and O’Muircheartaigh (1991). 
3. The exact question numbers for the three surveys are as follows. 1983: Q.9A (Party Vote); 
Q.13A (Party Identification). 1986: Group A. Q.3B (Vote Intention); Q.7A (Party Identifi- 
cation). Group B. Q.3A (Party Identification); Q.7B (Vote Intention). 1987: Group A. Q.5A 
(Party Vote); Q.lOA (Party Identification). Group B. Q.3A (Party Identification); Q.3lA 
(Party Vote). 
4. Butler and Stokes (1969, pp. 454-8) weighted their third wave responses jointly on three 
variables, the most important of which referred to political information, an item that is 
closely related to political involvement. 
5. ‘Tis a pity for several reasons. The B group of 1987 has the question order configuration 
that most closely approximates the one used in the IJnited States, as the two relevant 
questions are spaced widely apart (see n.3). 
6. The distributions of party identification and strength of party identification within Group 
A in 1983 differed somewhat from those within Group B. In order to standardize the two 
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groups on those variables, we computed a weight that, when applied to Group B, 
produced the same distributions on the two variables that pertained to Group A. When 
our analysis included 1987 respondents, this weight was combined with the weight 
designed to compensate for the loss by attrition of a disproportionate number of 
uninvolved persons. 
7. For 1987, when there is virtually no difference in the frequency of party identification 
between Groups A and B, the difference in the correlation between strength of PI and 
age is also larger for Group B (+ = 0.18) than for Group A (r = 0.13). 
8. It is by no means certain that this question would be interchangeable with a recent vote 
report for our purposes. Respondents might feel less of an impulse to make a declaration 
of party identification consistent with a prior expression of a vote intention (which 
implies no commitment) than with an earlier report of a recent electoral choice (which 
describes a decision). 
9. For all cross-tabulations involving party identification declarations exclusively, we have 
treated the Liberals, the Social Democratic Party, and the Alliance as separate parties and 
not interchangeable. 
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